Harmonization of unique dataset on probabilistic evolution of key energy technologies. Expectations about the impact of public R&D investments on future costs. Highlighting the key uncertainties and a lack of consensus on cost evolution. 
a b s t r a c t
In this paper we standardize, compare, and aggregate results from thirteen surveys of technology experts, performed over a period of five years using a range of different methodologies, but all aiming at eliciting expert judgment on the future cost of five key energy technologies and how future costs might be influenced by public R&D investments. To enable researchers and policy makers to use the wealth of collective knowledge obtained through these expert elicitations we develop and present a set of assumptions to harmonize them. We also aggregate expert estimates within each study and across studies to facilitate the comparison. The analysis showed that, as expected, technology costs are expected to go down by 2030 with increasing levels of R&D investments, but that there is not a high level of agreement between individual experts or between studies regarding the technology areas that would benefit the most from R&D investments. This indicates that further study of prospective cost data may be useful to further inform R&D investments. We also found that the contributions of additional studies to the variance of costs in one technology area differed by technology area, suggesting that (barring new information about the downsides of particular forms of elicitations) there may be value in not only including a diverse and relatively large group of experts, but also in using different methods to collect estimates.
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Introduction
The economic practicality of paths towards a sustainable future depends crucially on the future costs of low-carbon energy technologies. The recently published 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its summary for policy makers, points to the fact that: "estimates of the aggregate economic costs of mitigation vary widely and are highly sensitive to model design and assumptions as well as the specification of scenarios, including the characterization of technologies and the timing of mitigation" [IPCC 5th AR, WG III, mitigation2014.org]. Indeed, total discounted mitigation costs (2015-2100) may increase up to 138% when some technologies are limited in their availability. It is expected that costs for most of these technologies will continue to fall, driven by various factors including research and development, economies of scale, and experience effects. However, the specific trajectories that costs may take in the future are highly uncertain. In the absence of a clairvoyant who can eliminate these uncertainties, policy decisions should be informed by the most credible judgments of technology costs available, and incorporate explicit estimates of the uncertainties. Given that society may not be able to fund every research direction to a level that would make a difference, effective policy Contents lists available at ScienceDirect journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol decisions should include a probabilistic treatment of uncertainties over a large set of foreseeable scenarios using the best available information from technical experts at the time.
The 2010 InterAcademy Council review of the climate change assessment of the IPCC had only one substantive (rather than process-oriented) topic in its recommendations -the treatment of uncertainty:
"To inform policy decisions properly, it is important for uncertainties to be characterized and communicated clearly and coherently. … Quantitative probabilities (subjective or objective) should be assigned only to well-defined outcomes and only when there is adequate evidence in the literature and when authors have sufficient confidence in the results. … Where practical, formal expert elicitation procedures should be used to obtain subjective probabilities for key results" (Council, 2010) .
Similarly, the National Research Council (NRC, 2007) recommends that the U.S. Department of Energy use probabilistic assessment based on expert elicitations of R&D programs in making funding decisions. Thus, despite the inherent subjectivity of expert elicitations, they are the primary means for forecasting the implications of Research and Development, and are of growing interest.
On December 2-3, 2010, the Department of Energy's Office of Policy and International Affairs sponsored a two-day workshop on energy RD&D portfolio analysis. This workshop concluded that (1) the large and growing elicitation data sources need to be integrated with each other and with other relevant data on technology supply, and (2) that the integrated data needs to be communicated in ways that are useful to a variety of users, including both government decision makers and researchers who require expert technology supply information for their research (Clarke and Baker, 2011) . This paper outlines the results of three major expert elicitation efforts carried out independently by researchers at UMass Amherst (Baker and Keisler, 2011; Baker et al., 2008 Baker et al., , 2009a Baker et al., , 2009b , Harvard (Anadón et al., 2012 (Anadón et al., , 2014a Chan et al., 2011) , and FEEM (Bosetti et al., 2012; Catenacci et al., 2013; Fiorese et al., 2013) . Each of the three groups covered many of the most promising future clean energy technologies [IPCC 5th AR, WG III, mitigation2014.org]: liquid biofuels, electricity from biomass, carbon capture (CCS), nuclear power, and solar photovoltaic (PV) power. The surveys varied considerably in terms of quantities elicited, projected dates, funding assumptions, types of questions, and modes of survey administration. These differences make the comparison challenging, but also allow us to span a variety of different assumptions and detect whether there are robust insights to be drawn by these exercises taken together.
Current state of knowledge on expert elicitations for energy technologies
There exist a number of expert elicitation studies on energy technology projects and programs. Table 1 summarizes the studies to date that focus expressly on eliciting probability distributions over parameters of energy technologies. The EERE division of the USDOE has also performed a number of elicitations, but they are not publicly available.
These studies were performed independently across organizations (and sometimes within) and often are very difficult to compare, due to their structural differences. See Table 2 for an example of the range of studies on CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage). Among these studies, the potential futures are assessed at different target years, ranging from 2022 to 2050; they assess different technologies at different degrees of specificity, ranging from the NAS study that assessed the state of CCS in general, to the Rao and Chung studies which assess specific post-combustion technologies (absorption and chilled ammonia respectively); and they assess different endpoints, ranging from the overall cost of electricity, to capital costs and energy penalties, to specific technological parameters. Thus, without going through the process that we have developed in this paper, it is impossible to compare the results of the different studies. There have been no studies that we know of that attempt to compare the results of different probabilistic expert elicitations performed by different groups, whether on energy technology or any other area.
Rest of paper
In Section 2, we review the methodology of the elicitations themselves, of the harmonization, and of the aggregation across experts and teams. In Section 3, we present results from the harmonized and aggregated elicitations, including a discussion of the sources of uncertainty and disagreement. In Section 4, we conclude with a discussion of applications for policy and future energy technology expert elicitations.
Methodology
There are four main challenges to comparing and combining the estimates of cost and performance elicited using different surveys. First, the surveys elicited different metrics, with different levels of aggregation. For example, the Harvard and UMass solar surveys asked questions about capital cost and efficiency, while FEEM asked directly for the Levelized Cost Of Electricity (LCOE). Second, the surveys elicited probability distributions in different ways: the UMass survey elicited the probability that a quantity would reach specific values, while the others elicited the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for each quantity. Third, the surveys differed on time scale: Harvard and FEEM asked for estimates for cost and performance in 2030, while UMass asked about 2050. Fourth, they differed greatly in the level of public R&D investments upon which the probability estimates were conditional. In the remainder of this section we describe the design of the expert elicitations, the harmonization, and the aggregation processes.
Elicitation methodology
A total of 165 individual surveys or interviews with experts were completed by the three teams, each survey covering one (or two in the case of the Harvard bioenergy elicitation, which covered biofuels and electricity from biomass) of the technology areas. Some experts participated in multiple surveys, and the surveys of some experts were omitted due to missing data. Thus, there were between 114 and 119 distinct participating experts. (Due the anonymity of the individual surveys, we cannot narrow this number further). The complete list of experts is reported in the appendix. Unlike the Delphi method (Keith, 1996; Boje and Murnighan, 1982; Dalkey, 1969) , which introduces the effects of group dynamics in the answers of experts, the expert elicitations upon which this study relies were conducted independently.
R&D investments should be made with a sound understanding of the physics and engineering underlying each technology and of the possible impact that additional resources could have on scientific and technological advances. This was the main criteria that we used to select leading scientists and engineers in each technology domain from academia, the private sector and the national lab communities. This selection process consisted of reviewing publications, government reports, and conferences, to develop a short list of experts that was complemented with the recommendations of other top experts provided by the experts that were contacted initially.
The UMass and Harvard elicitations included U.S. experts and the FEEM elicitations included mainly experts from the European Union. The Harvard and FEEM experts spanned academia, public institutions, and the private sector, while the UMass elicitations excluded industry experts since UMass was focused on radical breakthroughs to be realized over a longer (2050) timeframe.
The elicitations used a range of methods: some were conducted face to face, some were conducted via mail or email in a written form (in most cases with additional interactions between researchers and experts over the phone), some were conducted online (again, with access to researchers when needed), and some of the online surveys were followed up by a group workshop. Below is a summary of the methods used by the three research teams for each of the five technologies.
À FEEM: biofuels (face to face), bioelectricity (face to face), nuclear (mail and group workshop), and solar (face to face). À Harvard: biofuels (mail); bioelectricity (mail and phone); nuclear (online and group workshop); solar PV (online); and CCS (mail and face to face). À UMass: biofuels (face to face, mail); bioelectricity (face to face, mail, phone); nuclear (face to face and mail); solar (face to face with mail follow-up); and CCS (face to face and mail).
For more details the reader is referred to the papers describing the different expert elicitations. In the case of the online and mail surveys, the elicitation protocols included phone conversations and/ or e-mail exchanges between experts and researchers as needed.
As discussed in the detailed papers and reports on the different elicitations, all three teams took precautions to correct biases inherent to expert estimates. In the UMass studies (Baker and Keisler, 2011; Baker et al., 2008 Baker et al., , 2009a Baker et al., , 2009b experts reviewed a primer on expert elicitation discussing possible biases. As the experts gave their probabilities (or after completing the survey in the case of mail surveys), the analysts used a series of probes aimed at debiasing, including asking about disconfirming evidence, asking backcasting type questions, and reminding the experts of overconfidence, especially when probabilities were very near 0 or 1. All experts were provided with a written summary of their responses, both verbal and quantitative, with the possibility of revising their responses.
In the Harvard mail and online elicitations (Chan et al., 2011; Anadon et al., 2012 Anadon et al., , 2014a experts were provided extensive background information including (1) a summary of the purpose of the elicitations; (2) information about government R&D programs, current costs and future cost projections in the literature; (3) a short tutorial on bias and overconfidence including visual aids; and (4) an explanation of percentiles, also including visual aids. In addition, the elicitations themselves included interactive tools, both in the mail and online elicitations. On average, experts invested between 2 and 5 h in completing the elicitations, plus additional time interacting with the researchers in some cases. All experts were provided with a written summary of the responses of all experts, with the ability to change theirs, and nuclear experts participating in a group following the individual elicitation workshop were given the possibility of revising their responses in private after each workshop session.
The FEEM studies (Anadon et al., 2012 , Bosetti et al., 2012 ) also included a preparatory document including information on technology costs and R&D funding and on biases. Each individual interview also included a first stage for training the experts in the elicitation process and discussing biases and heuristics. The interviews themselves included probing questions aimed at helping experts avoid overconfidence. Moreover, the questions were asked in multiple ways and then compared, allowing the expert to revise answers when needed. The average elicitation lasted more than three and a half hours.
The teams elicited different metrics for the different technologies. The top rows in Table 3 summarize the metrics that were elicited for each study, while the last two rows report the metrics used in this work to aggregate across surveys and the required assumptions.
Each study asked experts to assess uncertain future costs and performance of energy technologies conditional on the level of R&D funding by governments with the goal of examining the effect of government R&D on the costs of reducing carbon emissions. The studies defined R&D funding levels in different ways (see Table 4 ). The FEEM surveys focused on the implications of European public R&D expenditures, hence "Low" R&D refers to an average of yearly expenditure over a five year period, per data collected by the OECD (IEA, 2013); "Mid" and "High" scenarios represent an increment of one and a half and twice the current levels; the UMass and Harvard studies considered the impact of U. S. public R&D investments. Harvard's "Mid" funding level is an average of the experts' recommended funding level for research, development and demonstration; low is 1 2 this amount, and high is 10 times this amount. Harvard experts were asked to break down their recommended level of investment by specific technology area or research pathway and by the stage of technology development. The UMass funding levels were defined in conjunction with a subset of the experts in a bottom-up manner, with experts thinking about how many labs could reasonably do research on specific technologies. The UMass funding amounts do not include demonstration plants while the Harvard funding amounts do.
There are a number of challenges in evaluating the effect of government R&D funding on future technology costs, including the role of international and private sector spillovers, and the relationship between deployment policies and cost reductions through economies of scale and induced R&D. It is hard for any analyst, including the experts participating in each study, to disentangle these effects. Moreover, just as there is some evidence of insensitivity to scale in contingent valuation studies (Carson, 2001) , it is possible that the experts were not well-calibrated to the specific funding amounts -and would have given similar answers when considering a doubling of investment from $20 million to $40 million as they would from $200 million to $400 million. Therefore, in order to avoid over-specificity due to this list of challenges, we compare the results for low, medium, and high funding amounts in each study, against each other.
FEEM and Harvard asked their experts to provide 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for each quantity to be assessed as a probability distribution. The UMass survey asked experts to assess the probability of two to four specified cost values.
The set of technologies covered by these probabilistic expert elicitations are not comprehensive. For example, as seen in Table 1 , none of the probabilistic expert elicitations cover wind Funding Levels $M/yr. a The Nuclear survey is an exception for the FEEM surveys as it was carried out together with Harvard, hence the nuclear mid and high R&D levels represent the average R&D investment across all the experts corresponding to that R&D level. b Harvard combined Biofuels and Bio-electricity in one elicitation. The amount shown is the total R&D amount for both areas.
energy (a very important but relatively mature renewable energy), nor do they cover solar fuels (a technology that is in the very early stages of research). Future expert elicitations could focus on these and other technologies.
Fitting probability distributions to elicitation data
For the FEEM and Harvard surveys, we examined three approaches to fitting probability distributions to the elicited 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles (x 10 , x 50 , x 90 ): Triangular, shifted Weibull, and a piecewise cubic fit to the cumulative distribution. The triangular and Weibull distributions each have three parameters. A triangular can fit x 10 , x 50 , x 90 only if the skewness ratio (x 50 À x 10 )/ (x 90 À x 50 )o1.618. Similarly a Weibull can fit the three percentiles only if the skewness ratio is less than 1.569. Since only 58% and 57%, respectively, of the expert assessments have skewness ratios below these limits, we used the piecewise cubic method, which fits a cubic polynomial between successive percentiles, x 0 , x 10 , x 50 , x 90 , x 100 , on the cumulative distribution. We specify the minimum and maximum (x 0 and x 100 ) such that the ratios satisfy the following conditions:
We limit the minimum, x 0 , to be positive. Fig. 1 shows an example of a fitted distribution. For the UMass surveys, we first aggregated across experts using simple averaging of the probabilities. After aggregation across experts, a piecewise cubic was used to fit the selected points. This required additional assumptions in some cases about the zero and 100th percentiles.
Harmonization methodology
In order to compare and aggregate the elicited distributions, we harmonized them, making assumptions to have comparable currencies and currency years, endpoint years, and common metrics. Key assumptions used to convert to common metrics are included in the bottom rows of Table 3 . The fifth row of Table 3 shows the metrics that were chosen as the goal of the harmonization for each technology. Typically, the most aggregated metric elicited in each survey represented the binding constraint in defining the common metric. For this reason in most cases we used the FEEM surveys to define the common metric. An exception is the metrics for the bioenergy technologies. In this case we use two metrics, allowing us to disentangle biomass cost from the conversion technology cost. We did this in order to connect these results with Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) which take these distributions as inputs. Most IAMs treat the biomass cost as endogenous, and so must separate the energy and non-energy costs for the bioenergy technologies.
The sixth row of Table 3 summarizes assumptions. In order to divide bioenergy costs into energy and non-energy portions for the FEEM and Harvard studies, we assume that the fraction of nonenergy costs provided by experts at the mean is the same across the distribution. In the case of solar technologies, experts participating in the FEEM study provided their estimates in terms of LCOE under the assumptions of a 12% capacity factor. Thus, to make the UMass and Harvard costs comparable, their more disaggregated costs were converted into an LCOE metric using a 12% capacity factor, even though most of the Harvard and UMass experts would have provided LCOE estimates using a higher capacity factor if that had been the metric that they were asked about. In order to illustrate the impact of capacity factor on LCOE, Table 5 applies the TEaM assumptions to estimate the LCOE of a module cost of $0.75/Wp, estimated to be the 2013 cost of modules manufactured in China . The two rows use two different assumptions about Balance Of Systems (BOS) costs, consistent with assumptions by UMass (the lower cost) and the average from Harvard experts (the higher cost). These values can be compared to the range of values in Fig. 4 .
Finally, we needed to make no major assumptions to harmonize the nuclear overnight capital cost estimates, since all teams asked about the same metric. In Section 2.4.1 we discuss how we aggregated multiple different nuclear technologies into one category.
As previously mentioned, all UMass estimates were elicited for 2050. In order to make them more comparable to estimates in 2030, which was the timeframe used in the FEEM and Harvard studies, we backcasted the UMass 2050 estimates to 2030 assuming a constant learning rate (cost reduction percentage) per yearsimilar to Moore's Law for electronics. Nagy et al. (2013) looked at a large amount of data for many different technologies, and found that estimated costs that used only time as a parameter (like Moore's law) performed nearly as well as the traditional experience curve. Eq. (1) shows the cost curve used in the calculations. where c t is the cost at time t, m is a parameter of this model calculated from B, the learning rate, and g, the growth rate of production;
Thus we use this method to estimate the values for 2030, namely 
To estimate the parameter m, we combine learning parameters B from the literature, with the growth parameter g from (Nagy et al., 2013). Table 6 summarizes the parameters used. . Cumulative probability distributions (top) and probability density functions (bottom) for levelized cost of energy for solar in 2030 for low R&D spending for the aggregate and for each of the seven experts from the Harvard study. Cumulative distributions are piecewise cubic fit to 0, 10th, 50th, 90th, and 100th percentiles. 
Aggregation methodology
In their surveys of methods for aggregating probability distributions obtained from different experts Winkler, 1999, 2007) distinguish (i) mathematical approaches and (ii) behavioral approaches. Behavioral approaches are qualitative and involve the direct repeated interaction between experts in order to reach consensus on a single "group" estimate. Given the size and the coverage of the elicitations included the present paper, behavioral approaches would be prohibitively expensive.
Mathematical approaches use the individual probability distribution functions to construct a single probability distribution in two basic ways: either through axiomatically-justified mathematical formulas of aggregation, or, where possible, through Bayesian statistical methods that pay particular attention to issues of dependence and bias. Bayesian approaches to combine expert judgments treat each expert's judgment as data to be used in updating a prior distribution. They require assessment of a prior on the quantity of interest, usually specified as diffuse. Of greater challenge, they require specification of a likelihood function: a distribution of expert judgments conditional on the value of the uncertain quantity of interest -in other words, they require assessing the dependence among experts. Moreover, Bayesian methods typically assign zero probability in the combined distribution to any value to which any expert assigns zero. Experts are often overconfident and assign zero to ranges to which others might assign positive probability. Based on a comparison of results, simple averages typically perform almost as well as the theoretically superior, and technically much more complex, Bayesian methods (Clemen et al., 1996) .
For this reason we resort to the simplest and the most widelyused mathematical aggregation method of a weighted average or linear opinion pool. The aggregate distribution is the weighted average of the probability density (or cumulative probability) over the expert distributions. This method is sometimes called "Laplacean mixing" (Laplace, 1812) . In the present context we follow this approach and, for simplicity, we use equal weighting of the experts assessing each quantity in each study.
Visualizing the location of the distributions of different experts in relation to each other shows that many distributions have little or no overlap (Fig. 2) . Therefore the distributions from simple Laplacean Fig. 4 . 2030 costs and efficiency elicitation results across studies and R&D levels. We show the combined distribution of the three studies using equal weights ("Combined"), the FEEM aggregate, the Harvard aggregate, and the UMass aggregate and technologies by R&D level (Low, Mid, and High). The box plots show the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for each of the distributions, the diamond the mean value, and the black number the skewness of the distribution. mixing are often irregular with multiple modes (see Fig. 3 for a typical example). It is conceivable that, for a certain quantity, multiple modes may in fact reflect multiple schools of thought: for example, for nuclear power, some experts may believe that small modular reactors produced in large quantities are likely to lead to dramatically reduced cost; while other experts may not expect this to happen, and so expect the cost of nuclear power to remain high. Aggregating opinions of experts from both schools of thought might lead to a bimodal distribution that reflects the bimodal distributions of opinions.
However, this situation is uncommon. It is more likely that the multimodal distributions result from some or most experts being overconfident, that is, providing distributions that are too narrow given the inherent uncertainty. Accordingly, we smooth the distributions so that they are nearer "bell-shaped" with a single mode with tails on each side. We do this by fitting a piecewise cubic to the 0, 10th, 50th, 90th, and 100th percentiles from the Laplacean mixing distribution (Fig. 3) .
We also present results for a combined distribution aggregated across the three teams. We again use Laplacean mixing with equal weights for each team and apply piecewise cubic smoothing.
Aggregating various nuclear technologies into a single metric
For nuclear power, the Harvard and FEEM studies both elicited estimates for three technologies: nuclear large-scale generation IIIþ systems, nuclear large-scale generation IV systems, and nuclear factory built (or small modular reactors). We assume that the market and/or future power system planners will select whichever technology has the lowest cost. Thus, for each study, we combined these estimates over the technologies selecting the lowest cost technology from a Monte Carlo sample from the cost of each technology, assuming an 80% rank correlation between the costs of each technology. UMass elicited estimates for independent projects involving different nuclear technologies (including advanced light water reactors, High temperature gas cooled reactors, and Feeder reactors), and similarly assumed that only the lowest cost technology would be chosen when preparing the aggregated distribution.
Results
Here we present results on 2030 costs of the different technologies aggregated across experts for the individual teams and for the combination of the different teams. We discuss the implied effectiveness of R&D, reporting results for different R&D funding levels. Finally, we unpack the information that gets lost when showing aggregate figures of probability distributions or uncertainty ranges: we discuss in detail the key sources driving the uncertainty surrounding these aggregate distributions in terms of the uncertainty that comes from disagreement between experts about the mean versus the expert-specific uncertainty.
Distributions of cost and efficiency metrics
In order to evaluate the expected impact of public R&D investments on the 2030 cost and performance of the five technologies covered by the teams, in Fig. 4 we plot the distribution of cost for five cost metrics (Levelized Cost of Electricity for solar ($/kWh); non-energy cost for bioelectricity ($/kWh) and for biofuels ($/gallon of gasoline equivalent); additional capital cost for CCS ($/kW) and overnight capital cost for nuclear ($/kW)) and of performance for three efficiency metrics (conversion efficiency for bio-electricity and biofuels, energy penalty for CCS) for three different funding scenarios: low in red, mid in green, and high in blue. To allow for an easy visual comparison of the impact of R&D within studies, for each of the 8 metrics presented, we plot the results for the impact of the three different R&D levels next to each other. This representation also allows a relatively straightforward comparison of the differences across studies. The box plots show the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for each of the distributions. The empty spaces reflect the fact that not all groups asked questions about all parameters. Only half of the metrics investigated -Solar LCOE, bio-electricity non-energy cost, biofuels non-energy cost, and nuclear capital cost -were estimated by all three studies. Note that these studies were done in 2008-2010, so the experts were predicting future costs based on the current costs at that time.
Across all studies, metrics, and budget levels, increasing levels of public R&D investment are associated with cost decreases and efficiency improvements, as shown by the upwards movement of the box plots for efficiencies and the downwards movement of the box plots for the cost categories and energy penalty as R&D levels increase.
The experts seem to agree that R&D investments are expected to have a major impact on Solar LCOE by 2030. At the median, LCOE is expected to be reduced by 20% from low to medium funding, and by another 20% by increasing investments from the medium to the high funding levels. Note that the solar results are particularly difficult to compare across the three teams, since the harmonization required applying common exogenous assumptions about insolation and discount rates, among other factors, to the Harvard and UMass component data to make them comparable to the FEEM data. As mentioned above and illustrated in Table 3 , FEEM used a somewhat pessimistic assumption of a 12% capacity value. Moreover, the price of solar has decreased rapidly since the time that these studies were done. Current estimated solar prices of about $0.75/Wp would translate into an LCOE of between $0.17 and $0.28, depending on assumptions about BOS. The lower estimate is about equal to the median 2030 cost estimated by the combined teams at low R&D investment. This implies that the very rapid reduction in solar costs over the last few years was a surprise, and the experts have perhaps underestimated the possibility of cost reduction over the next 20 years.
Bio-electricity non-energy costs show a relatively consistent range of outcomes across the three studies, ranging from 0.025 to 0.125 $/kWh for the interquartile range. The Biofuels non-energy cost shows distributions that are significantly skewed upwards (with skewness coefficients that generally range from 0.8 to 2.12, with one exception), indicating a large probability of high cost outcomes, when compared to the distributions of the other metrics.
CCS additional capital costs exhibit a less pronounced upper tail, but still show wide uncertainty. We see similar outcomes between the two teams with data for the Low R&D scenario, but very different ones for the High R&D scenario. While Harvard experts expected that, at the median, R&D would reduce additional CCS capital cost by about $200/kW, UMass experts expected costs to come down by $800/kW.
Nuclear capital cost shows a wide range of perspectives for the future of nuclear power in 2030. The aggregated distributions of the FEEM and Harvard studies suggest that nuclear capital costs will be around $5000/kW, similar to the estimate in the MIT 2009 Update to the Future of Nuclear study (Ansolabehere et al., 2009 ).
Returns to R&D 1
In Anadon et al. (2014c) , we report on the returns to R&D. Specifically, Fig. 5 shows the percentage increase (for efficiency) or decrease (for cost and energy penalty) in each metric as we move from low to mid funding, or mid to high funding. We found that most of the technologies had similar returns in the 20% range (with CCS the exception); and that no technology fared well in all three studies (i.e., across the elicitation studies conducted by FEEM, Harvard and UMass).
Thirteen of the 24 panels with two points in Fig. 5 clearly show decreasing marginal returns to scale, with a lower return for the Mid-to-High investment than the Low-to-Mid. In almost all the other cases in which the Mid-to-High return is higher, the additional investment to get from Mid to High is also very large. Thus, marginal return per dollar of R&D investment is in fact decreasing in all cases, except for CCS energy penalty as assessed by UMass. Thus, we see that the results imply that experts have a model of decreasing marginal returns to additional R&D dollars.
Such a model may be explained by two different underlying beliefs. One is a "fishing-out" model (Jones, 1995) . This implies that there is only a certain amount of innovation available in any one category, and so with large enough investments the ideas start to get fished out and returns decrease. Another is a model of decreasing returns within a period, but a recharging between periods (Nordhaus, 2002) . The increase in R&D amounts in most of the studies were presented as increasing amounts over a fixed amount of time, rather than an extension of the period of research. Thus, while the experts may have been envisioning a fishing-out model, it is also possible that they were identifying decreasing returns within a period. It would be very interesting in future research to test whether explicitly asking experts to think about having additional time to devote to a particular research project has a different effect than adding funding over a set period of time. Table 7 shows each team's ranking of the technologies, with technologies listed by the highest median return for each technology in either the low to mid or the mid to high funding increase. Clearly there is very little agreement between the teams on which technologies have the best prospects for significant improvements in response to R&D.
Sources of uncertainty
In an expert elicitation with multiple experts (and in this case also with multiple studies), there are multiple sources of uncertainty. Each individual expert incorporates uncertainty into his estimate. Differences between experts then add additional uncertainty. Finally, in this case, the differences between the studies add a final dimension of uncertainty. Uncertainty within each expert's estimate reflects each individual expert's assessment of how much is known about the particular question (in this case future costs and performance contingent on public R&D investments). However, it is important to note that experts tend to be systematically over-confident: they assess distributions which are too narrow and lead to numerous surprises (Lin and Bier, 2008) . Uncertainty between experts reflects disagreement between the experts, which in turn reflects different knowledge sets (and to some degree, different biases). Averaging different experts counterbalances the over-confidence seen in individual experts. In fact, a distribution that is derived from averaging across well-calibrated experts (that is, experts who are not over-confident) will be under-confident, or too diffuse (Hora, 2004) . Given, however, that individuals are almost always over-confident, this is a correction. Finally, disagreement between studies leads to yet more uncertainty. This may reflect different biases that may be related to the different metrics elicited, question wording, and modes of data collection ; or it may reflect that the different studies worked with significantly different sets of experts.
Here we decompose the uncertainty into two of these factors. Fig. 6 illustrates the contribution of variance allocated between the individual-experts and the between-experts in the FEEM and Harvard studies. (We did not calculate these values for the UMass study as the individual probabilities were first aggregated and then continuous distributions were estimated.) Eq. (1) decomposes the overall variance of a distribution into two parts, where w i is the weight given to each individual expert i, σ i is the standard deviation of each individual expert's distribution, m i is the mean of individual i's distribution and m x is the mean of the aggregated distribution. We interpret the first term as representing the individual experts' variances and the second term as the between-expert variance. (See Jenni et al., 2013 for a similar method).
As shown in Fig. 6 , we find that both factors -intra-expert and interexpert uncertainty (or disagreement) -are significant contributors.
In most of the studies, more than half of the variance is attributed to the between-expert variance; this is particularly strong in the Harvard study for solar power when compared to the FEEM study. This may indicate that individual experts are over-confident, a typical finding in the literature (Henrion and Fischoff, 1986; Morgan and Henrion, 1990) . A large number of studies have shown that experts are not well-calibrated, with between 20% and 45% of correct values falling outside of assessed 98% intervals (rather than the expected 2%). Overconfidence can also be judged by the degree to which experts overlap. A lack of overlapping in distributions indicates that non overlapping experts (at least all but one of them) are overconfident; we see this in many cases in our data. The large betweenexpert variance also may imply that information about the technologies is not well-diffused through the community (Jenni et al., 2013) . Particularly striking is the difference between FEEM and Harvard in the solar studies. One interpretation is that European experts are much closer to consensus than US experts. On the other hand, this difference may also be driven by the fact that the Harvard LCOE costs were calculated using disaggregated cost components provided by experts: it may be that the European experts anchored more strongly on available estimates for LCOE, whereas few similar available estimates exist for the metrics assessed in Harvard study.
In a similar way, Fig. 7 illustrates the relative contribution of within-study variance and between-study variance. The two variances are calculated according to Eq. (1), where, in this case, i is the individual study and x is the combined distribution. Here we see that while there is a great deal of disagreement between studies when looking at the median values of the cost and performance, most of the variance in the combined distribution comes from the uncertainty expressed in the individual studies.
Conclusions
Given that significant amounts of funding are being invested in R&D in energy and low-carbon technologies by some public agencies, and that many stakeholders have requested an increase in these investments, it is crucial to obtain estimates of the possible returns to society of such activities, both economic and environmental. This paper summarizes the result of a multi-team study, comparing a number of expert elicitations in five important technology areas performed independently. The starting point for this study was a set of existing expert elicitations. For this study, we harmonized the results over R&D funding amounts, metrics, and timing. We then aggregated the results, first across experts within each expert elicitation study, and then across the various elicitation studies covering each technology. We present results for each team and for the aggregation over teams, and indicate the amount of variation that occurs between experts and teams.
It was very challenging to harmonize and compare the disparate elicitations, yet this is crucial for researchers and policy makers to get an understanding of the current state of knowledge. An important suggestion for future elicitation studies is for all such studies to make assumptions very explicit in order to ease future comparisons. Moreover, a central database for collecting and comparing energy technology probability distributions would provide great benefits to future researchers. Along this vein, the results of these surveys are available on-line at http://megajoule.org/.
Balancing out the great challenges of harmonizing this data, there is considerable value in this process and the outcomes. In particular, we see a considerable amount of disagreement between the studies, both on the absolute values of the metrics elicited and on the possible returns from higher investments in R&D. For example, we see that when comparing technologies in terms of the median return to R&D, each team has a different ordering for the technologies. A policy maker who stopped at one study may be overconfident about the relative value of additional R&D investment in one technology area when compared to another area, given the current state of information. This study suggests that our understanding of what R&D can buy us is at an early stage for most of these technologies. Moreover, in providing a combined data set along with the underlying team data sets, we allow researchers and policy makers to make near-term decisions based on the best available information, with a clear understanding of the amount of disagreement and uncertainty underlying it.
Given the findings, this study implies that there is the need for more research, both into trying to understand the prospects for future technological advancement, and in a wide spectrum of R&D programs themselves. The disagreement between experts does not imply that research should stop or is inefficient, but rather the opposite, that there is much knowledge to be gained by further research at this point.
Typical of expert elicitation studies, we see a considerable amount of overconfidence among the individual experts, illustrated by the many non-overlapping distributions as well as the large amount of variance allocated to the difference between experts (as opposed to the variance being reported by each expert). Future studies may want to include some additional techniques for reducing over confidence, such as presenting experts with past surprises for related quantities, such as periods during which a technology costs increased or dropped rapidly -e. g. cost of photovoltaic modules increased from 2004 to 2008, and then dipped by a factor of about 4 from 2008 to 2012; incorporating information about past learning curves (although this may unduly anchor experts to previous technical change); and having experts participate in group discussions before or after (see Anadon et al., 2012 ) the elicitations to ensure that the current state of knowledge among the participating experts is well disseminated among them. One consequence of overconfidence, as well as of the incomplete information that all experts have, is that truly transformative breakthroughs can be missed, even in expert elicitations designed to minimize biases and include a wide range of viewpoints. Consumers of expert elicitations should be aware of this.
Nevertheless the risk of missing relevant breakthroughs decreases with the number of experts considered, and with the diversity of their backgrounds. Hence in this study we take into account a large number of experts from diverse backgrounds that participated in three independent studies in the USA and EU. In fact, this study shows that the process of eliciting and combining multiple experts results in less overconfidence in each of the study's aggregated distributions. This is illustrated by the fact that the overall variance in the combined distribution is due almost entirely to the variance in the underlying team distributions, rather than to disagreement among the teams. What this means is that, even though the individual team elicitations disagree in terms of medians and means, in most technology areas each of the studies does a pretty good job of covering a wide range: a draw from the distribution in one study is not highly likely to be a surprise in the distribution of another study. On the other hand, we still see a significant amount of between-study variance in one technology (nuclear). Given that it is hard to know where these widespread disagreements will take place, there is still value in multi-team studies like this, not only for understanding disagreements between experts over the central values, but also for establishing well calibrated probability distributions.
One result coming out of the data is that the experts have a model, implicit or explicit, of decreasing returns to scale in R&D investment. This brings up a couple of interesting questions for future work. First, are the experts reporting decreasing returns to scale because this is such a common model for investment, or do the decreasing returns accurately reflect their views of the particular technology they are analyzing? The second question is whether the experts are assessing decreasing returns consistent with a fishing-out model or consistent with a recharge model.
One particular challenge of using expert judgment to inform energy technology R&D decisions is the very large number of technologies that can potentially be part of a portfolio. Expert elicitation studies are very resource intensive. One question that this study brings up related to this is whether it would be better to have very detailed, resource-intensive interviews with a small number of experts for each technology; or whether it would be better to have much lower cost elicitations (such as automated online surveys) with a large number of experts. The fact that between-study variance was low for many (but not all) technology areas may indicate that it does not strongly matter in terms of getting a reasonable probability range, so that the deciding factor may be the overall cost. However, this study was not designed to test this question and it only provides some very general indications.
This study is aimed at determining whether and to what degree energy technology R&D investments can be narrowed down across a particular set of technologies and to what extent they should be increased. We found that given the current set of studies, there is not strong support for reducing or eliminating funding in any of the categories we considered, instead, given the uncertainty around the returns there is strong support for increasing investments and diversifying them. We emphasize that the process of harmonization makes statements about the absolute returns to R&D difficult; the main focus is on comparing these technologies against each other and comparing the findings of different teams. 
